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Sectarian History: The Construction of Meaning in India
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the construction of religion and social identity in India. Religion is an
incredibly complex social phenomenon and must be examined holistically for a true appreciation of history.
This paper follows the idea of authority and legitimacy, why religions are adopted, who designs
administrations around them and how those administrations are informed. This ties into an examination of
history, how it is written and what purpose that writing serves from a social perspective. This paper also
examines how meaning systems coexist and affect each other, and how they in fact evolve together in a
reciprocal process of development, and how identities are formed across people, in terms of defining one’s
normative characteristics as well as the otherness of outsiders. By trying to envision the perspective of a group
by unpacking the meaning system that underpins the group’s understanding, it may be possible to discern the
nature of some conflicts. This may also allow for a deeper understanding of why some groups seemingly adopt
definitions of themselves that are not conducive to their own history, but rather a functional byproduct of a
neighboring group’s understanding. Finally, social divisions are examined from the perspective of observable
religious syncretism in India, what factors brought it about, what sustained it, and why it disappears in some
cases but not all.
Honors project mentor: Eddie Boucher, Adjunct Professor, History
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 Any group studying an unfamiliar culture faces the problem of analogic reasoning and an 
associated risk of fallacies that are difficult to escape. For a country like India, which has 
endured foreign occupation for centuries at the hands of the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal 
Empire, followed by the British, these fallacies have had the potential to be transmitted to the 
indigenous population, as generations have grown into an environment where their lineage and 
history has been continually appropriated. The notion of a Hindu identity, and who “invented” it, 
must be unpacked in order to clearly discern legitimacy when it comes to ownership of the 
history of a people. The purpose of this paper is to analyze some of the scholarship surrounding 
this issue, as well as some of the social theory that influences the construction of religious 
meaning. 
Ascendancy 
The fabrication of metanarratives, both on the part of outside observers and from within a 
culture itself, depends on the usage of socially constructed meaning systems. Regardless of being 
culturally innate or politically designed, metanarratives are a form of social trust. Like religions, 
they are sustained by a substantial population believing in them, and because of this, they can be 
difficult to impress upon a people who subscribe to a conflicting narrative, and equally difficult 
to dispel once they have been adopted. Short of deciding what qualities should be assigned to it, 
the very notion of a pre-colonial Hindu “nation” is itself laden with social constructions secured 
to a Western umbilical, containing a range of meaning that is inherently culture bound. 
This debate over Hindu communalism or an early sense of a Hindu nation, with different 
arguments demonstrated in historical evidence, implies that there are conflicting and therefore 
“false” interpretations of what it means to be Hindu, both now and in the past. It also implies that 
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there is a singular, normative form for this identity, with one linear program for understanding its 
history, which all legitimate Hindus should subscribe to. It is a sort of fantastic way to appreciate 
a large body of humanity, with all of its complexities and richness, and is tantamount to 
Orientalist thought, which these absolutist criteria are derived from. In this vein, ownership over 
the Hindu identity translates to an ownership of the past, which according to Gyanendra Pandey 
is constructed, and that “the modern history of India…was first written in colonial times and by 
colonialists (23).” 
Hegemony over the heritage of a people comes from the perceived acceptance of those 
people to participate in that heritage, to adopt the identity that has been constructed for them. 
Once secure in the immutable annals of tradition, a “self-containing, self-reinforcing character of 
a closed system” emerges and becomes the catalogued norm of the power structure (Said 70). 
These norms then act to inform the social structure, which is inevitably a primary consideration 
for the design of an administration, which in recognizing the needs and differences of its 
citizenry, lends further legitimacy to the “invented” groups. In this way, we can see the 
arguments for the legacy of modern communalism as an array of understanding that reflects a 
historical British understanding of the social constituency of colonial India (Stoler Miller 784). 
This understanding is a realization of Peter Berger‟s famous work on what he describes as the 
“fundamental dialectic process of society”, where identity creation, and society at large, is a 
constant process of externalization, objectification, and internalization (4). In view of Berger‟s 
work, Hindus are an evolutionary product of themselves, whereby projecting themselves into the 
world, they experience themselves in the form of human product, and reassign new meaning 
within themselves to formulate a sense of cohesion in the world they live. The role of the British 
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is coincidental; there will always be antagonisms, social and otherwise, that people respond to as 
part of Berger‟s externalization process.  
The irony here is that in aligning against an alien body, be it the British or Islam, Hindu 
sentiments were likely galvanized among Indians, presenting themselves perhaps as “more 
Hindu” than they really might have been. Berger‟s process needed no further encouragement, as 
the British recognition of an expressed Hindu identity serves as its objectification; in this sense 
the British were merely observers of forms they encountered as being presented to them in 
earnest. The common lack of acknowledgement of the role Indian scholars and informants has 
historically played in shaping the Western understanding of India is what Mohammad Tavakoli-
Targhi has referred to as “orientalism‟s genesis amnesia (Lorenzen 639).” With a new 
metanarrative in place that determined the identity of the Hindu people, it was only a matter of 
time before it came to be re-appropriated and internalized by Indians as new definitions were 
codified into social awareness. 
But these groups are more than mere constructs of the British, the result of a Western 
approximation of observable trends. To admit that these communities are often congruent with 
religious traditions is only to say that the British understood people at the time in terms of their 
faith, which was probably the most apparent and ready-made social division, but also perhaps 
had come to the forefront of social importance for communities that had been responding to and 
developing alongside Muslim rule for hundreds of years. 
Benedict Anderson has observed that “all communities larger than primordial villages of 
face-to-face contact…are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined (6).” With this thought in mind, 
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the question of when Hindus became Hindus presents itself as the moment when they were 
observable to others as a distinct body of people. The distinction is important, because regardless 
of being observed by Muslims or British colonials, a comparison was made; one between the 
observers and the people who would come to be known as Hindus.  
To think of a social group as homogenous is to think of it as self-aware, in concert and in 
agreement with itself. Here we see the proposition of a pre-colonial Hindu nation as precarious, 
as early Indic, which is to say “pre-Hindu”, history is marked by a clear divide between 
Brahmanism and Sramanism, with documented animosity existing between them (Thapar 211). 
However, it seems likely that these divisions were reconciled in order to collectively face the 
superior alien “otherness” of monotheism as Islam was introduced into India. 
Juxtaposed Meaning Systems 
To allow that a comparison was made between cultures invites questions about how these 
comparisons were constructed. Modern anthropology employs processes such as hermeneutic 
exposition in order to translate culture bound “emic” information into objective “etic” 
information within some kind of working theoretical framework. Of course the pitfall to this 
natural human predilection to try and view the unknown in terms of the known is that “this kind 
of transformation replaces one meaning system (the “inside” views of one‟s informants) with 
another meaning system (the theoretical perspective of the investigator (Young et al. 118)).” 
Even the perception of empirical data is a construction, and it is just as subject to the bias and 
prejudices that warrant the need for objective thought. It is easy to see how this problem would 
be compounded by distance, which is to say difference, between people as an increasingly 
inappropriate set of analogues would be used in order to try and approximate the culture of the 
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other in terms that could be understood domestically. The fact that this approach depends on a 
common metric of etic data (such as Sanskrit among many Hindu sects) ensures some amount of 
cultural misunderstanding, as all parties surely would consider their own viewpoint as self-
evident truth.  
Thapar has argued that Hinduism, unlike Jainism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity, is 
not the evolution of a single catechism, which has since developed into various branches and 
sects, but “is rather [a] mosaic of distinct cults, deities, sects and ideas and the adjusting, 
juxtaposing or distancing of these to existing ones (216).”1 This could imply that the perception 
of likeness among normative Hindu practices might have proven beneficial or practical to local 
communities in some way, perhaps galvanizing sentiments among existing neighbor 
communities rather than the spreading of doctrine through proselytizing or evangelism.  
Trying to imagine a Hindu pantheon from within the context of monotheism immediately 
presents problems. It seems unlikely that Allah would not be a key component, if not the base of 
the perspective informing the Muslim etic construct. However, depending on what Hindu sect 
was encountered, Brahmanic tradition could be either present or absent in the observable emic 
information. This construction of respective cultural metanarratives makes comparison 
seemingly impossible. With Muslim sectarian divisions as a perfect example, certain theological 
disputes within the Muslim world, such as the Sunni/Shi‟ite disunion based in the question of 
legitimacy of the caliphate, may not be reconcilable. However, there is no disagreement in Islam, 
even along sectarian lines, that the word of Allah as delivered through the Qu‟ran and the 
                                                          
1
 There are many who would reject the idea that Jainism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity have evolved from 
single catechisms, but Thapar‟s point that these have a clearer source material than Hinduism seems sound. 
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teachings of the prophet Muhammad are the ultimate authority; both sides assert that the other 
has merely interpreted this authority incorrectly.
2
 
However, a Hindu identity cannot be traced back to a singular authority or textual record 
but “instead, a mass of oral and written literature composed in more than twenty languages 
(Stoler Miller 786).” Lorenzen has observed that an appreciation of this variety and diversity is a 
suitable perspective for outsiders, due to the “empirical fact that the beliefs, practices and human 
organization of Hinduism are less standardized and centralized than…those of Roman 
Catholicism or Sunni Islam (643).” 
While commenting about the boundaries that are inevitably erected by a culture‟s ethical 
standard, Max Weber wrote that “the absolute impurity of those outside one‟s own religion, as 
taught by the Shiite sect of Islam, has created in its adherents crucial impediments of intercourse 
with others…(41). Weber goes on to discuss Hindu caste taboo in a like fashion, which brings to 
light the terrific irony that these very devices of social arrangement are what could potentially 
serve as a common bond between cultures, while effectively ensuring both parties are unable to 
truly experience each other. The cultural emphasis on tenants rather than observable tendencies 
is part of the “etic construct” of both sides, and therefore the similarities pertaining to taboo, 
exclusion, stratification, and socio-religious status will be stifled by one side‟s status as infidels 
and the other as untouchable. However, a clue to the ensuing syncretism of the era may be 
hidden in these day-to-day cultural similarities that hide in the shadow of the pronouncements of 
the respective dogmas. 
                                                          
2
 Sufi Islam challenges this idea, as it has been historically notorious for challenging central Muslim authority with 
regard to Muhammad and the Qu‟ran. It brings up an important question: How many tenants or traditions can one 
forego before being defined as something else entirely? And who decides that definition? 
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If we take Anderson‟s comments about imagined communities at face value, the 
discussion becomes less about an accurate historical account, but instead an argument about 
whose perspective should be adopted as canon. Sheldon Pollock has observed that “the symbolic 
meaning system of a political culture is constructed, and perhaps knowing the process…is a way 
to control it (264).” This phenomenon is not a recent development, as it certainly holds true for 
Diya al-din Barani and accounts of his Ta’rikh-i-Firuz Shahi, which, in an effort to rightly guide 
Muslim rulers of the Delhi Sultanate, was driven more by “Barani‟s conception of truth (which 
was) religious and ethical, not historical (Hardy 317).” In a similar fashion, the Ramayana was 
used to animate public support and inform the “political imagination” of India between the 11th 
and 14
th
 centuries (Pollock 282-286). A power structure will always find a narrative like the 
Ramayana attractive because it allows alignment with modes of authority that are so ingrained in 
the mind of the public that they go unquestioned. However, this necessitates a pre-existing 
identity that must have been robust enough to accommodate translation into a new design, and 
therefore cannot be seen an exclusive construction of a ruling body- power in the present 
depended on the precedent set by the history of previous administrations. 
However, to say that identity construction that is informed by this kind of agenda is not 
“real” again begs the question of who holds the authority to deem religious identities as either 
genuine or false. A sense of meaning, once established in a society, has real impacts and 
consequences: from which temples are built, to which gods are lost to antiquity as new forms 
emerge, to the level of violence between communities.
3
  John Rogers has pointed out that even 
identities formed from within the “essentialist frameworks” of British colonial rule are no less 
                                                          
3 Demonstrated by events like the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992, which was followed by 
months of rioting and the deaths of approx. 2,000 people. Regardless of historical accuracy or theological 
correctness, it could be argued that sentiments are made real by their consequences. 
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authentic than the more fluid identities of the pre-colonial era (20). To say that modern Hindu 
nationalists are misguided in looking to the past to justify their position does not diminish their 
very real impact on the world- in this way, “false” identities have the potential to have a greater 
influence on the world that the “real” ones. 
Syncretic Otherness 
 Cynthia Talbot has asserted that “identity formation in praxis always involves…the 
articulation of group boundaries that exclude others and the development of internal criteria for 
solidarity (699).” This appreciation of identity formation as a dual process accounts for the fact 
that no group develops in a vacuum, and no group of any size can exist without affecting its 
neighbors, resulting in a sort of cycle of reciprocal reactions. 
 It follows that an evolution of the understanding of divisions would also entail, with 
initial conflicts based on cleavages that would in retrospect seem like minor differences, as 
increasingly foreign nations and peoples were encountered further from an original locality of 
likeness. Lorenzen comments extensively on the nature of “otherness”, stating that identity can 
only be recognized by contrast, and so “without the Muslim (or some other non-Hindu), Hindus 
can only be Vaishnavas, Saivas, Smartas or the like. The presence of the Other is a necessary 
prerequisite for an active recognition of what the different Hindu sects and schools hold in 
common (648).” In short, the cleavages that existed between these groups were at least severe 
enough for different groups to emerge as separate entities in the first place, but once Islam was 
encountered, these differences paled in comparison to what they collectively encountered in the 
form of monotheism. This again seems to damage the prospect of an early Indic Hinduism that 
existed as we appreciate it today, although it appears that core Brahmanic likenesses were 
8
JCCC Honors Journal, Vol. 4 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://scholarspace.jccc.edu/honors_journal/vol4/iss2/1
  
prevalent enough for foreign nations to assume they were in fact the same people. It is worth 
mentioning that Indians did not understand the introduction of Islam into India as a single influx 
of Muslims, but rather a collection of new people identifiable by geographical, ethnic, or cultural 
understandings (Thapar 223). This may actually allude to an early Indic common understanding 
of self, which did not place religion as the hallmark characteristic of a people, and did not feature 
a religious union that joined people across vast spaces in the way that, for instance, trade routes 
might have. 
 It leaves the question of why a clearly diverse group would eventually identify 
themselves as outsiders had defined them. Derived from the word Sindhu, the native name for 
the river Indus, the Persian adoption “Hind” or “Hindu” was originally used to describe the 
people living east of the Indus River (Lorenzen 635). Initially, this label merely drew attention to 
the fact that those it referred to were not Muslims. Once again Berger‟s dialectic process helps 
illustrate how this identity may have taken shape. The word “Hindu” used by the Persians was an 
externalization because they were defining the world, or in this case, the people in it, in terms of 
themselves: they are not Muslims, they are just Hindus- the people over the river. The sentiment 
was codified and transmitted among Muslims, who objectified their own externalization, in fact 
bringing it with them into India to inform the new administrations of the sultanate and realize 
this new public in terms the caliphate could understand. Once so affected by this process, an 
Indic culture that was historically known for being accommodating was taken aback by a foreign 
people that did not assimilate the way others had. Faced with the potential threat of a massive 
oppositional unity, which revealed the common bonds between them through the opposition‟s 
otherness, the Indians adopted the term for themselves, internalized it, and imbued it with new 
meaning: we are not Muslims, but we are not just the people over the river, we are a vast, rich 
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people; we are Hindus. There may not have been an occasion for Hindus to consider themselves 
on such a scale before the introduction of Islam into India. It may be that “totalizing 
conceptualizations of society…became possible only by juxtaposition with alternate life-worlds; 
they became necessary only at the moment when the total form of the society was for the first 
time believed…to be threatened (Pollock 286).” This transference, or rather adoption, of the 
Muslims‟ emic framework into the Hindu imagination seems to have helped foster a syncretic 
etic meaning system that was shared by both sides, as an arguably new incarnation of Islam 
emerged alongside a sense of Hindu identities which were becoming more lucid and a tandem 
development ensued. 
 However the initial process took shape, to say that the defining of Hindus by Muslims 
was some kind of foundation for an enduring communal schism in India is to ignore a historical 
wealth of syncretic functionalism and tolerance. Talbot reminds us that throughout South India, 
the politically dominant “Muslim polities of the peninsula were dependent on Hindu officials and 
warriors for tax collection and maintenance of order in the countryside (706).” Tolerance made 
political sense, but so many aspects of day-to-day social structure were rooted in caste or 
economic class rather than religion, provincial trading of religious symbols and mythology came 
to be commonplace; in some cases seemingly as a mere byproduct of contact. Such exchanges 
were exemplified by folk literature in Tamil-Nadu, where guardians in the Draupadi cult are 
actually Muslim figures, and the blending of Puranic and Qur‟anic personalities in the mangal-
kabyas in Bengali (Thapar 225). Pindari war bands, boasting both Hindu and Muslim soldiers 
“appear to have developed a syncretic popular religion in which goddess Kali featured alongside 
Muslim saints as the objects of veneration (Bayly 184).” Bayly seems so convinced of the social 
forces driving the shape of religious practices as to assert that the decline of this type of mobile 
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“warrior culture” contributed to more distinct rifts between Hindu and Muslim practice in the 
19
th
 century (184). Bayly helps illustrate that once a common enemy was removed, familiar 
divisions were once again erected along the lines of religious differences. 
Perhaps the most enduring example of syncretic understanding is in India‟s most famous 
Mughal ruler, Akbar the Great. Akbar‟s legacy is broad but might best be marked by his concept 
of “divine religion”, in which he effectively set the legitimacy of all faiths within his kingdom on 
an even tier to one another. Interestingly, Akbar‟s attitude may have been influenced by poets of 
the era, including Guru Nanak who “repeatedly insist on the one religious message that God and 
spiritual reality are the same no matter what names we give them, nor what ideas we have about 
them (Lorenzen 652).”  It begs the question of whether or not Akbar‟s motives were purely 
political. Regardless, the lasting impact of Akbar‟s sentiments can still be seen today in India in 
countless ways, but perhaps none more appropriate than the adornments of his own tomb, which 
alongside Arabic calligraphy are local and Hindu symbols, including the lotus flower and the 
swastika.
4
 
The emergent picture is one of a developing narrative dominated by contradictions and 
anomalies, centered around two cultures pushed together, with one holding no meaningful 
understanding of the concept of conversion, and the other having no intention to convert. It is 
also a picture that shows that absolutism did not function in the world quite in the way as it was 
outlined by religious imperatives. Religious tolerance made political sense, encouraged 
economic growth through a wider acceptance of trade partners, and created a buffer of 
                                                          
4
 Observed in Agra during a tour of Northern India Jan. 2013. Also observed during this same trip was the Tomb of 
Shaikh Salim Chisti, built by Akbar within the walls of Fatehpur Sikri to honor the Sufi saint- true veneration or 
political device?  
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legitimacy between a broad and diverse population and a single, often foreign, administration 
that clearly benefitted by being able to keep people neatly classified.  
Conclusion 
 If the modernist perspective that “the roots of ethnic and cultural nationalism…are seen 
as indigenous response[s] to the impact of colonial rule” is true, it seems logical that the ongoing 
conversation is an extension of this phenomenon, manifested as attempts to debase nationalist 
claims about the past (Rogers 10).  
The West tends to view colonialism as an era we are now removed from in the modern 
world, something that happened in the past that we may now comment on. But the fact is that 
colonialism is an ongoing process, existing in the modern reading of history books as much as in 
the antiquity recorded in them. If we are to have any kind of honest, empirical discussion about 
identities, Hindu or otherwise, we must first acknowledge the ongoing construction of what 
Pandey refers to as the “false totalities of ready-made religious communities (13).”  
The authority to rightly define religious identities exists only in the minds of people 
willing to acknowledge it; a willingness that may be borne out of desperate situations, such as 
complex socio-political disputes camouflaged as religious conflict. Scholarship that means to 
trump claims about the present by reaching into the past is playing the same game of dominion 
as those vying to justify their right to control by asserting ownership over history. As Lorenzen 
put it: “Only a recognition of the fact that much of modern Hindu identity is rooted in the history 
of the rivalry between Hinduism and Islam will enable us to correctly gauge the strength of 
communalist forces and wage war against them (631).” 
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